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DEPOSITARY BANK LIABILITY UNDER § 3-419(3)
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The exigencies of financial affairs have historically necessitated
the use of various forms of commercial paper' for the efficient
consummation of most business transactions.' In particular, the
almost universal usage3 of checks4 has been prompted by their convenience for discharging monetary obligations. However, abusive
practices have accompanied the check phenomenon, creating perplexing legal problems. One particularly troublesome area has been
that of determining the rights and remedies that should be afforded
the true owner of a check when the check is collected 5 on an unauthorized endorsement for the benefit of one who has improperly come
into its possession.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) by
the states, the true payee of an order instrument 7 had an undisputed
right to recover the money properly due him from at least four parties
'Commercial paper is a term of art which includes "drafts," "checks," "certificates of deposits," and "notes." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter UCC] § 3104. Commercial paper is to be distinguished from money, documents of title, and
investment securities. Id. § 3-103.
2
The negotiable instrument evolved in direct response to the need by the commercial community for a method to transact business over great distances without the risk
of carrying or transporting money. See J. HOLDER, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 1-3 (1955). The bank check, a form of negotiable instrument, is
the natural outgrowth of the development of banking itself. The phenomenal growth
of the bank check as a medium of exchange is evidenced by its efficient performance
today as the vital conduit for conducting the commerce of the country. See H. BAILEY,
BRADY ON BANK CHECKS 1-3 (4th ed. 1969).
3
In 1962, the estimated volume of checks was approaching 14.5 billion which
amounted to 4.7 trillion dollars. O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 189, 190 n.9 (1969). Forecasters predicted that
this volume would reach twenty-two billion checks by 1970. Farnsworth, A General
Survey of Article 3 and an Example of Two Aspects of Codification,44 TEXAS L. REv.
645, 652 n.63 (1966). It is estimated that checks are used in ninety-five percent of all
business transactions. Vergari, In reArticles 3, 4, and 5, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 529, 538 (1955).
'A check is one of many forms a negotiable instrument may take. Specifically, a
check is a negotiable instrument drawn on a bank which is payable on demand. UCC
§ 3-104(1) and (2)(b).
5
Collection is the process of sending a check through normal banking channels for
final payment by the drawer's bank. The collection process is governed by Article 4 of
the UCC. See UCC § 4-101 and Comment.
'Unauthorized endorsements, which include forged endorsements, are those made
without actual, implied or apparent authority. UCC § 1-201(43).
'A check is payable to order when by its terms it is made payable to a particular
person. Id. § 3-110.
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who had dealt with the instrument.8 Although there was an enormous
amount of disagreement among the jurisdictions as to the particular
theories of recovery, 9 nearly all courts recognized the right of the
payee to recover from a depositary bank that took the check for
collection. The bank was generally liable to the true owner under
either a tort theory for conversion of the check" or a contract theory
'Generally, the right of a true owner of an instrument to recover was founded in §
23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law [hereinafter NIL]. Since under § 23 the party
who received the proceeds of the forged check had no right to them, the true payee
could sue one of three parties in addition to the forger himself; the drawer of the check,
the payor bank which paid the check over the unauthorized endorsement, or the bank
that cashed or agreed to collect the check and received the proceeds from the payor
bank. Against the drawer of the check the cause of action was generally recognized as
one on the underlying obligation for which the check was given, since the genuine payee
had never received any money. See, e.g., Hart v. Moore, 171 Miss. 838, 158 So. 490
(1935); Siegel v. Kovinsky, 93 Misc. 541, 157 N.Y.S. 340 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 174
A.D. 864, 159 N.Y.S. 1142 (1916); Shepard & Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass.
516, 51 N.E. 9 (1898). But where the check was stolen from the mails or otherwise
diverted prior to the payee's physical receipt, in some jurisdictions he was unable to
recover from the drawer. See, e.g., Graves v. American Exch. Bank, 17 N.Y. 205 (1858).
The payee could always recover from the payor bank when the check was formally
accepted by the payor bank. Citizen & S. Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 54 Ga. App. 836, 188
S.E. 589 (1936). Where there was no formal acceptance of the check, those jurisdictions
which allowed recovery against the drawee employed four theories. The payee could
sue the drawee in tort for conversion. Louisville & Nash. Ry. v. Citizens' & People's
Nat'l Bank, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117, 111 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1951). Contra, Gordon Fireworks Co.
v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263 (1926); Strickland Transp. Co. v.
First State Bank, 147 Tex. 193, 214 S.W.2d 934 (1948). A second theory was founded
in contract as for money had and received. Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort
Dearborn Nat'l Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N.E. 458 (1924). Contra, Lonier v. State Sav.
Bank, 149 Mich. 483, 112 N.W. 1119 (1907); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,
supra. The third theory was constructive acceptance. Chamberlain Metal Weatherstrip Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 98 Kan. 611, 160 P. 1138 (1916). Contra, Elyria Sav.
& Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N.E. 147 (1915); Lone Star
Trucking Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 240 S.W. 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). Finally, the
payee via assignment of the drawer's rights could recover against the drawee. Wormhoudt Lumber Co. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 231 Iowa 928, 2 N.W.2d 267 (1942).
Recovery against the drawee was sometimes denied if the payee never received the
check. Jones v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 49 Cal. App.2d 115, 121
P.2d 94 (1942).
The genuine payee's right to recover from a depositary or collecting bank was
generally upheld, although on different theories. Notes 10-11 infra.
'See the theories discussed at note 8 supra.
"*Fabricon Prod. v. United Cal. Bank, 264 Cal. App.2d 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1968);
Wilton Manors Nat'l Bank v. Adobie Brick & Supply Co., 232 So.2d 29 (Fla. App.
1970); Good Roads Mach. Co. v. Broadway Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (Mo. App 1924); E.
Moch. Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1917); Lindsley v. First
Nat'l Bank, 325 Pa. 393, 190 A.876 (1937); Zidek v. Forbes Nat'l Bank, 159 Pa. Super.
442, 48 A.2d 103 (1946).
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for money had and received."
Section 3-419(3) of the UCC seemingly altered this pre-UCC status of depositary bank liability.12 On its face, the statute provides an
absolute defense to the depositary bank that acts reasonably and in
good faith, except to the extent of the check proceeds which may still
be in its hands:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive endorsements a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of
"Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 96 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1938); Merchants &
Mfrs. Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Ariz. 531, 14 P.2d 717 (1932); Morgan v. Morgan,
220 Cal. App.2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963); George v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank,
91 Cal. App. 708, 267 P. 560 (1928); National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148
Md. 449, 129 A. 688 (1925); Rosaocker v. Commercial State Bank, 191 Minn. 553, 254
N.W. 824 (1934); Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d
117, 111 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1951). Many states allowed the true owner an election of remedies in suing the depositary or collecting bank. E.g., Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens
State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847 (1966). For an exhaustive summary of the
cases, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965).
'The following are the state statutes containing the language of Uniform Commercial Code § 3-419(3): ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 3-419(3) (1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.356(c)
(1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 44.3556 (3) (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-419(3) (1961);
CAL. COMM. CODE § 3419(3) (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 155-3-419(3) (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42a-3-419(3) (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 3-419(3) (Spec.
UCC Pamphlet 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:3-419(3) (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.3419(3) (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-3-419(3) (1962); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:3-419(3)
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 28-3-419(3) (1967); ILL. REV STAT. ch. 26, § 3-419(3) (1971); IND.
CODE § 26-1-3-419(3) (1971); IOWA CODE § 554.3419(3) (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-3419(3) (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. § 355.3-419(3) (1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,§ 3419(3) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 3-419(3) (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
106, § 3-419(3) (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.3419(3) (Rev. Vol. 1964); MINN. STAT.
§ 336.3-419(3) (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41A: 3-419(3) (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 400.3-419(3) (Supp. 1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 87A-3-419(3) (1964);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 90-3-419(3) (Supp. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.3419(3) (1971); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:3-419(3) (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:3-419(3) (1962); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 50A-3-419(3) (1962); N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-419(3) (Repl. Vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03-56 (1965); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1303.55(c) (Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-419(3) (1963); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 73.4190(3) (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-419(3) (1970); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 6A-3-419(3) (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.3-419(3) (1962); S.D. CODE § 573-4 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-3-419(3) (Repl. Vol. 1964); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
§ 3-419(3) (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-419(3) (Repl. Vol. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9A, § 3-419(3) (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-419(3) (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
62A.3-419(3) (Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-419(a) (1966); Wis. STAT. §
403.419(3) (1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. 34-3-419(3) (Cum. Supp. 1971). None of the jurisdictions listed above has adopted UCC 6 3-419(3) in a form different than the official
code.
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such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on
behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in converbeyond the amount of any
sion or otherwise to the true owner
13
proceeds remaining in its hands.
Since in most instances a forger would have cashed the check or
withdrawn the proceeds of the check if deposited prior to the true
owner's suit, commentators felt that the § 3-419(3) defense would
totally absolve the depositary bank from any liability to the true
owner.' 4
The judicial reaction to this apparent alteration of pre-UCC depositary bank liability has generally been a refusal to recognize the §
3-419(3) defense.' 5 A Pennsylvania trail judge applying the UCC in
,3UCC § 3-419(3) (emphasis added).
"The overwhelming opinion of experts in the field of commercial law was that §
3-419(3) of the UCC would insulate depositary and collecting banks from liability. 2
R. A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1035 (2d ed. 1971); H. BAILEY, BRADY ON
BANK CHECKS § 15.14, at 499 (4th ed. 1969); 2 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION STUDY
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1079 (1955); R. L. STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND THE UNIFORa COMMERCIAL CODE 120-22 (1963); Cosway,
Negotiable Instruments-A Comparison of Washington Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 WASH. L. REV. 499, 543 (1968); O'Malley, Common Check Fraudsand
the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 189, 231 (1969); Shkolnick, The
Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3-Commercial Code, 43 NEB. L. REv.
724, 735 (1964); Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law
of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 471
(1953). Only one case has construed § 3-419(3) in a manner consistent with this expert
opinion. Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So.2d 553 (Fla. App. 1972). Several cases have
implied a similar interpretation. Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 275 Cal. App.2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969) (dictum); Stone
& Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358
(1962) (dictum); Forman v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 Misc.2d 433, 320 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1971)
(dictum).
'"The majority of cases that have specifically considered the applicability of § 3419(3) has denied its defense on several grounds: (1) Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust
Co., 84 Dauph. 280, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 3 UCC REP. SERv. 311 (1965) (depositary
bank not acting as "representative"); (2) Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal.3d 123, 507 P.2d
609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973) (depositary bank still held proceeds); (3) Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); Salsman v. National
Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (Law Div. 1968), afl'd, 105 N.J.
Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969); Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust
Co., 65 Misc.2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank,
96 Ore. Adv. Sh. 1258 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (depositary bank did not deal with true owner's
instrument in a commercially reasonable manner and, therefore, proceeds defense was
not applicable); (4) Mississippi Bank & Trust Co. v. County Supplies and Diesel
Servs., Inc., 253 So.2d 828 (Miss. 1971) (depositary bank held jointly and severally
liable with payor bank and held solely liable to payor bank via cross-claim).
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Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit and Trust Co."6 held a depositary bank
liable despite the fact that the bank had acted reasonably and had
cashed the checks for the forger. More recently, in Cooper v. Union
Bank, 7 the California Supreme Court sitting en banc adopted an
interpretation of the statutory term "proceeds" which effectively
eliminated the availability of the defense. Since the propriety of the
Ervin and Cooper decisions may well determine the future viability
of § 3-419(3), a detailed analysis of their rationale is necessary. However, before an accurate conclusion as to the true import of these
decisions can be made, the language of § 3-419(3) must be examined
against the background of the decisions which established the liability of depositary banks prior to the UCC.18 Additionally, since the
Official Comment to § 3-419(3)" indicates that the subsection was
intended to adopt the reasoning of pre-UCC decisions which dealt
with the liability in conversion of brokers selling stolen negotiable
instruments, a full understanding of pre-UCC broker liability20 is
imperative.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) both brokers and
depositary banks were generally liable to a true owner when an instrument was dealt with over a forged endorsement. A broker, as an
agent for his customer was liable in conversion to a true owner as was
his principal,2' since he stood in the shoes of his customer when he
sold personal property. The broker was not protected from liability
by the mere fact that he acted on behalf of his principal and that he
reasonably, although mistakenly, believed that his principal had
been lawfully in possession of the property. 2 Because a forged endorsement transferred absolutely no rights to the endorsee,2 a customer had no power to transfer a fraudulently endorsed negotiable
instrument to his broker for disposition,24 and the broker derived no
1684 Dauph. 280, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 311 (1965).

Cal.2d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
"See notes 33-47 infra and accompanying text for discussion of pre-UCC depositary bank liability in conversion and otherwise.
1IUCC § 3-419(3), Comment 5.
'See notes 21-32 infra and accompanying text for discussion of pre-UCC broker
liability for conversion.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 349 (1957).
22
1d.
'NIL § 23 provided that a forged or unauthorized endorsement was "wholly inoperative" and, therefore, created no rights in the endorsee.
2Since
a forged endorsement was "wholly inoperative" the principal who wrongfully took possession of the instrument without the payee's endorsement took no title
to the instrument and, therefore, had no power to transfer title. See NIL § 23.
179
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power to convey good title.2 5 Accordingly, a broker who innocently
sold a negotiable instrument over a forged endorsement was fully
liable in conversion to a true owner,"6 even though the proceeds may
have been remitted to the customer.
Despite this general doctrine on agent liability, the courts developed an exception for an agent who dealt with negotiable securities
in bearer form.Y When a broker sold stolen bearer bonds and remitted
the proceeds of the sale to his principal in good faith, 28 the courts
refused to find the broker liable in conversion to the true owner. The
judicial justification for this exception was essentially two-fold. First,
since the bonds circulated like money and title passed by delivery
alone, the broker was held to have little or no means of ascertaining
any outstanding rights of the true owner.2 1 Second, because the bonds
were in bearer form and a bona fide purchaser from the agent acquired a valid title and was protected from suit in conversion, the
courts reasoned that the agent, as the innocent conduit of valid title,
nAn agent derives his power from his principal. If the principal could not convey
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §
12 (1957).
2
INo pre-UCC cases specifically considering the liability of a broker for the conversion of a negotiable instrument over a forged endorsement have come to the attention
of this writer. However, since a negotiable instrument constitutes personal property,
the law with respect to the conversion of personal property is applicable to all negotiable instruments. Since in the case of forged endorsements a potential converter such
as a broker acting as an agent of a wrongdoer would have no title to the instrument,
an act of sale inconsistent with the true owner's rights would constitute conversion.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 223, 241 (1965).
2
1E.g., Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918); Gruntal v. National
Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 268, 173 N.E. 682, 246 N.Y.S. Appdx. 468 (1930); First Nat'l Bank
v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941). A bearer instrument is one made payable
to "bearer," "to cash," to the "order of bearer," "to the order of cash," or to any other
indication which does not purport to designate a specific payee. UCC § 3-111.
21In First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A2d 377, 378-79 (1941), a Pennsylvania court aptly described what the good faith standard required:
To defeat the rights of one dealing with negotiable securities it is not
enough to show that he took them under circumstances which ought
to excite the suspicion of a prudent man and cause him to make
inquiry, but that he had actual knowledge of an infirmity or defect,
or of such facts that his failure to make further inquiry would indicate
a deliberate desire on his part to evade knowledge because of a belief,
or fear that investigation would disclose a vice in the transaction.
For a comparison of the pre-UCC good faith standard with the commercial reasonableness standard which the UCC has imposed to protect agents in Articles 3 and 8,
see note 50 infra.
nGruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 470, 173 N.E. 682, 684, 246 N.Y.S.
Appdx. 468, 470 (1930); First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377, 380
(1941).
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should also be afforded such protection." The exception, although
very narrow, 31 recognized the need to enhance the ready transferabil32
ity of bearer bonds.
The pre-UCC liability of depositary banks was distinct from the
unique treatment extended to brokers dealing with negotiable bearer
bonds. Just as the innocent agent who sold stolen personal property
was generally liable to its true owner in conversion, a depositary bank
in the absence of negligence, laches or estoppel was liable to the payee
whose endorsement was forged. 33 Despite the near uniform acceptance of the premise that liability existed in the absence of a specific
defense, there was some difference in the legal justification behind
that premise. As mentioned earlier, there were two theories of recovery: one in tort for conversion of the true owner's property3' and one
in contract for money had and received."
Cases which permitted recovery under the tort theory reasoned
that the depositary bank in receiving a check for collection obtained
"First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377, 380 (1941).
The defense of good faith was allowed only to the broker who sold investment
securities while in bearer form. Nevertheless, the specific court decisions espousing the
rule framed it so as to imply that the defense was available when dealing with all forms
of negotiable instruments. See cases cited at note 28 supra. Certainly a security could
be negotiable and yet not be in bearer form. See NIL § 1. Since the justification for
the special rule of liability developed for the dealer in bearer bonds would be inapposite
where endorsements are necessary to transfer valid title, it seems that despite the
language of the various court decisions, the rule only applied to securities which were
in bearer form.
12In Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682, 684, 246 N.Y.S.
Appdx. 468, 470 (1930), the leading case on the conversion of bearer bonds by an agent,
the court indicated that public policy simply did not require the imposition of a harsh
rule of liability on an innocent seller of bearer bonds. The court recognized that these
bonds were readily transferable and should continue to be so without placing too great
a risk on the parties who deal with them.
*See cases at notes 10-11 supra.
"For cases allowing recovery in tort for conversion, see note 10 supra.The measure
of damages under the tort theory was prima facie the face value of the instrument as
opposed to the remedy for an action in contract which was the proceeds of the check
or the amount of money collected by the depositary bank on the instrument. This
formal distinction in remedies proved crucial when a defendant could show that for
some reason the drawer's obligation to pay was valueless and therefore the instrument
worthless, i.e., an insolvent drawer.
A second important aspect of the distinction between the tort and contract theories of recovery was the determination of when a true owner's action might be barred
by the statute of limitations. The actions in conversion and for money had and received
were unequivocally governed by the tort and contract statutes of limitations, respectively. See Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847
(1966).
3For cases allowing recovery for money had and received, see note 11 supra.
31
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no title to the check if the individual depositing it had none. Since
the validity of the check, the scope of the order to pay, and the payee
himself were fixed at the initial preparation of the instrument, it was
presumed that the payee was the true owner of the paper. By collecting the check and crediting the amount to the depositor, the bank
necessarily assumed dominion over the instrument inconsistent with
the payee's control of his own property and therefore converted the
instrument. The damages for the conversion of a negotiable instrument were prima facie its face value."
Many jurisdictions also afforded the true owner a right to recover3
from the depositary bank in contract for money had and received. 1
Under this theory of recovery, when a depositary bank had collected
a check over a forged endorsement, the courts reasoned that the bank
held the proceeds of the collection in the same way for the payee as
it had originally held the check,3 and that this implied relationship
created an obligation on the part of the bank to pay the proceeds only
to the true owner. 9 However, a necessary pre-requisite to the courts'
implying this promise to pay was the payee's ratification of the collection of the check by the depositary bank." Since a payor bank could
only pay out its depositor's money in accordance with the depositor's
direction or order,4 the payee could not claim that the proceeds collected by the depositary bank were properly his unless he ratified the
uA description of the legal elements of the tort recovery can be found in the
following cases: Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lindell Trust Co., 348 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961); Good Roads Mach. Co. v. Broadway Bank, 267 S.W. 40 (Mo. Ct. App.
1924); Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.H. 190, 136
A.2d 910 (1957); Hillsley v. State Bank, 17 App. Div.2d 686, 230 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1962);
Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1917); California
Stucco Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 344, 268 P. 891 (1928).
'See cases at note 11 supra.
:"When the bank took the check for collection, it became the payee's agent and
agreed to be bound by the terms of the check. One obligation derived from the terms
of the instrument required the bank's payment of the check proceeds to the true payee
only. See Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847,
853 (1966). It was the breach of this obligation which gave rise to the money had and
received cause of action.
"See note 38 supra.
"Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847, 853
(1966). Ratification' is one of the characteristic rights that a principal may exercise in
respect of the actions of his agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 82 (1957).
In an action for money had and received, the act of bringing suit against the depositary
bank was deemed the act of ratification. 419 P.2d at 854 (1966).
"Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293, 294 (1919).
See W. BarrrON, BILLS AND NoTEs §§ 142, 147 (2d ed. 1961).
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collection from the payor.42 Having ratified the collection, yet having
43
been wrongfully denied the proceeds by the payment to the forger,
the payee was afforded the right to recover damages from the depositary bank in the amount of the proceeds without regard to good faith,
notice, knowledge or duty of inquiry.4 The bank was fully liable even
though it may have parted with the money it collected. 5
The result under both the tort and the contract theories of recovery was identical for the depositary bank: full liability without any
defenses founded in good faith or the absence of proceeds. Depositary
banks were treated as any agent would have been treated who mistakenly, although innocently, converted the personal property of another. 6 The unique rule of nonliability which protected the broker
who sold stolen bearer bonds was justifiably not extended beyond its
narrow coverage since the particular considerations which persuaded
courts to insulate the seller of bearer bonds from liability in conversion were inapposite where a forged endorsement was involved.47
When the language of UCC § 3-419(3) is analyzed in light of these
established judicial policies which formed the background against
which the subsection was formulated, the apparent alteration of preUCC depositary bank liability manifests itself. The statute seemingly
requires that when a depositary bank" acts honestly 49 and in a comzMackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P. 2d 847, 853
(1966). The act of bringing suit against the depositary bank meant that upon the
payee's recovery he was pro tanto estopped from suit against the drawee or the drawer.
Id. Since the collection became proper via ratification, the drawee's payment to the
depositary bank was deemed proper.
"The payee could ratify the collection of the check without ratifying the improper
payment of the proceeds to the forger. 419 P.2d at 855.
"Id. at 853.
"Id. at 853-54. Specifically, the Kansas court in Mackey-Woodard stated: "It is
no defense to a collecting bank that it has fully paid over and accounted for the
proceeds of a check, which it collected from the drawee bank, to the forger or unauthorized indorser without knowledge or suspicion of the forgery or unauthorized indorsement in a suit by the payee for money had and received." Id. at 854.
"Compare text accompanying notes 21-26 supra with text accompanying notes 3345 supra.
7
1 See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
"Section 3-419(3) applies to "representatives." By definition an agent is a representative. UCC § 1-201(35). According to § 4-201 of the UCC and the comment thereunder a depositary bank is an agent of the owner of the item which has been presented
for collection. Id. § 4-201(1) and Comment 1. Regardless of whether the depositary
bank cashes the check for an individual or credits an account before collection, the
settlement given is provisional and the bank is an agent until final settlement. Id. §§
4-104(0), 4-201(1) and Comment 1. It seems clear, therefore, that even absent the
language "including depositary and collecting banks" a depositary bank would nevertheless qualify as a "representative" and be entitled to the § 3-419(3) defense.
"Honesty in fact is required by § 3-419(3) in order to have access to the defense
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mercially reasonable manner," but no longer has the proceeds of the
instrument in its hands,5 ' it should not be liable "in conversion or
otherwise"52 to the true owner. While the care exercised by a bank and
the location of the proceeds of the check were totally irrelevant to the
determination of a depositary bank's liability to a true owner under
pre-UCC judicial doctrine,53 § 3-419(3) made these two elements the
prerequisites for an absolute defense to liability. In that respect, the
drafters vastly expanded the availability of a defense which had previously been allowed only the broker dealing with bearer bonds. In
light of the unique characteristics of the bearer bond which traditionally justified relaxation of the general rules of broker liability, it is
not clear why the drafters chose to expand the availability of the
defense to all representatives dealing with any form of commercial
paper over a forged endorsement. The legislative history to § 3-419(3)
offers little explanation, 4 and the only apparent justification would
provided therein. The subsection requires thai the bank act in "good faith" which via
UCC § 1-201(19) means honesty in fact.
OSection 3-419(3) states that the bank must act "in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative." UCC
§ 3-419(3). The Official Comment to § 3-419(3) implies that the subsection is intended to adopt the pre-UCC rule of decisions which insulated brokers dealing in good
faith with negotiable securities. See cases cited at note 27 supra. Although the standard of good faith was more difficult to meet under the NIL than the honesty in fact
test for good faith found at UCC § 1-201(19), it would appear that the overall standard
of care required under § 3-419(3) is far more stringent than any standard of care set
under pre-UCC judicial doctrine. See note 28 supra. The UCC standard of care has
been labelled as "shifting and unpredictable." Britton, Defenses, Claims Of Ownership
And Equities-A Comparision Of The Provisions Of The Negotiable Instruments Law
With CorrespondingProvisions Of Article Three Of The Proposed Commercial Code,
7 HAST. L.J. 1, 46 (1955). The adoption of the commercially reasonable test unquestionably introduces an objective standard of care which must be met by any party attempting to utilize the § 3-419(3) defense. Post-UCC judicial decisions have construed it to
be just that. See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482,
246 A.2d 162 (Law Div. 1968), affd, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969);
Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co., 65 Misc.2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup.
Ct. 1970).
"The honest and commercially reasonable depositary bank is expressly held liable
under § 3-419(3) only to the extent of the "proceeds remaining in [its] hands." The
drafters quite inappropriately provided no definitions which offer any help in defining
what this key phrase actually means. It is this portion of § 3-419(3) which was construed in Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal.3d 123 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
"2The phrase "or otherwise" implies that all theories of recovery which applied
under pre-UCC legal doctrine shall continue to apply, subject to the § 3-419(3) defense.
OSee, e.g., United States Portland Cement Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 61
Colo.334, 157 P. 202, 203 (1916); National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md.
449, 129 A. 688, 690 (1925). See also notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
-Official Comment 5 to § 3-419 provides the entire legislative background for § 3419(3). The comment is misleading at best. The only accurate claim is that § 3-419(3)
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appear to be that the provision was the result of a general effort by
the drafters of the UCC to encourage the transferability of commercial paper by offering banks greater protection. 5
Suits directly against depositary banks by owners of checks paid
over forged endorsements have been few since the adoption of the
UCC by the states. 6 Possibly, potential litigants have been discouraged from direct suit against the depositary bank because of the
increased protection seemingly afforded the bank by § 3-419(3). However, as mentioned above, both the Pennsylvania court in Ervin v.
Dauphin Deposit & Trust Co. 57 and the California court in Cooper v.
Union Bank" have severly threatened the future vitality of this insulation from direct suit embodied in § 3-419(3). Both courts unexpectedly interpreted the language of the subsection so as to justify findings that § 3-419(3) did not alter pre-UCC depositary bank liability.
The propriety of these decisions must be examined in order to determine whether they provide a sound legal basis upon which future
litigants can seek to avoid the § 3-419(3) defense.
The Ervin decision, which was rendered in a judgment on the
pleadings, represents the earliest reported case construing the language of § 3-419(3). In Ervin an employee took checks payable to his
employer's order to defendant bank where they were cashed over the
employer's forged endorsement and later collected from the payor
is new. The indication from the comment is that the pre-UCC broker cases, which §
3-419(3) is said to have followed, allowed a good faith defense for agents dealing with
all forms of negotiable instruments. A proper analysis of the rule of decisions adopted
by § 3-419(3), however, indicates that the defense was applicable only to the agent
selling investment securities in bearer form. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
A proper legislative comment would have more fully disclosed the vast expansion of
the good faith defense beyond the narrow scope of its pre-UCC coverage.
"For an excellent discussion of the allocation of losses on forged checks under the
NIL and the Uniform Commercial Code and the various aspects of Articles 3 and 4
which represented an effort by the drafters to protect banks dealing with commercial
paper, see Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417 (1953).
The apparent rationale of increased protection for banks is that it would serve to
expedite the collection process and therefore enhance the circulation and transferability of commercial paper. See Miller and Crea, The Uniform Commercial Code: Effect
on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in New York, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 204, 258
(1963).
-'Apparently, only one decision involving § 3-419(3) has actually protected a depositary bank from liability. See Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So.2d 553 (Fla. App. 1972).
For a list of cases which have held depositary banks liable in conversion despite § 3419(3), see note 15 supra.
"84 Dauph. 280, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 3 UCC RP. SERV. 311 (1965).
"19 Cal.2d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
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bank. The employer, as the true owner of the instruments, sued the
defendant bank in contract for money had and received.- The defendant bank interposed § 3-419(3) in defense to this suit and demurred
to the true owner's complaint. Notwithstanding the language of § 3419(3), the court overruled the defendant's demurrer, holding that
the defense was not applicable.
In overruling the depositary bank's demurrer, the court made several observations concerning the § 3-419(3) defense. The court recognized that the statute included depositary banks within its broader
concept of "representative," yet proceeded to hold that the "clear
meaning" of the subsection was to include them only when acting as
a "representative." 6 Citing § 1-201(35) of the UCC wherein the term
"9representative" is defined, the court concluded that "[t]he entire
subsection [§ 3-419(3)] speaks of something other than the negotiating or the honoring of a check when it refers to the representative
having 'dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who
was not the true owner.' "61 Apparently relying on the Official Comment to § 3-419(3), the court ruled that the subsection referred only
to the type of transaction involved in the pre-UCC cases where a
broker selling bearer bonds was afforded the defense similar to that
embodied in § 3-419(3).62 Having concluded that the subsection was
inapplicable, the court held the bank subject to the pre-UCC rules
3
of liability.
5'See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra for a discussion of this pre-UCC contract theory of recovery.
113 UCC REP. SERv. at 318.
uId.
"Id. at 319. This conclusion by the court is confusing since the cases referred to
in the Official Comment deal with the sale of investment securities which under the
UCC are within the exclusive coverage of Article 8. UCC §§ 3-103, 8-101.
133 UCC RP. SERV. at 318. The court also formulated an alternate theory for
overruling the defendant bank's demurrer. Since the bank had cashed the checks over
the forged endorsement, the court reasoned that the bank constituted a purchaser and
therefore still held the proceeds of the checks in its hands. When the bank purchased
the checks it did so with its own money and, therefore, the proceeds subsequently
collected from the payor bank were the check's proceeds, and belonged to the true
owner. Id.
There is considerable support for the court's proposition that a cashing bank
constitutes a purchaser-support derived from pre-UCC as well as post-UCC judicial
decisions. Compare Kaufman v. State Sav. Bank, 151 Mich. 65, 114 N.W. 863 (1908),
with Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 253 Cal. App.2d 268,
61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967). See also H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS, § 15.14, at 499500 (4th ed. 1969). However, it would appear that courts which continue to distinguish
between the cashing bank and the bank that merely credits an account are doing so
in disregard of the provisions of Article 4. Section 4-201 of the UCC affirmatively
establishes that a bank is an agent for collection and all settlements given are provisional until final settlement is made by the payor bank. In defining what constitutes
a settlement the UCC is absolutely clear that it may be a payment in cash or by credit.
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The Ervin decision cannot stand on its statutory analysis, and its
rationale should be of little precedential value. The basic failure in
the court's reasoning derives from its total disregard for the statutorily defined status of depositary banks as agents while collecting negotiable instruments.64 The court's principal justification for denying
the defense to the bank was that when the drafters provided the
defense to depositary banks dealingwith instruments while acting as
agents, they did not envisage the negotiation of checks as constituting
such activity.15 There is no legislative history which would support
such a contention.66 Rather, the language of § 4-201 of the UCC seems
to establish without question that § 3-419(3) was designed precisely
to cover the depositary bank which, while an agent for collection,
makes a provisional settlement" over a forged endorsement. Consequently, when the Ervin court held that the defendant depositary
bank did not act in a representative capacity when it collected the
check over the forged endorsement, it adopted a position directly in
conflict with the language of § 4-201 of the UCC. That conflict must
be resolved in favor of the subsection and the statutory construction
utilized in Ervin, therefore, should have little effect on future litigation under § 3-419(3).68
As did the Pennsylvania court in Ervin, the California Supreme
Court in Cooper v. Union Bank severely restricted the availability of
the § 3-419(3) defense to depositary banks, in effect making it inapplicable unless the owner is barred by a defense such as negligence."
In Cooper the plaintiff was an attorney who had in his employment

UCC § 4-1040). When a depositary bank cashes a check, under the UCC that bank
merely makes a provisional cash settlement and becomes an agent for collection. Id.
§ 4-201. Against the background of the UCC concept of bank settlements and the more
precise provisions of § 4-201, different treatment for the cashing bank vis-a-vis a bank
that credits an account is tenuous at best.
"'UCC§ 4-201 and Comment 2.
13 UCC REp. SERV. at 318.
6
The Official Comment indicates an obvious intent on the part of the drafters to
treat banks collecting checks as agents. See UCC § 4-201, Comment 1. The Official
Comment to § 3-419(3) provides absolutely no basis from which to infer that this
agency status is not applicable when the depositary bank is sued in conversion.
"Settlement is defined at § 4-1040) of the UCC. A provisional settlement is one
that is made immediately upon presentment of an item for collection and becomes
final only after final settlement by the payor of the instrument. See UCC § 4-201.
"The Ervin case has received considerable attention from commentators and the
consensus is that the court's statutory analysis was wholly inaccurate. See, e.g., H.
BAILEY, BRADY ON CHECKS § 15.14, at 496-501 (4th ed. 1969); J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-14, at 505 (1972).
6
A negligent payee is barred from recovery under the UCC; he is precluded from
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a woman whose duties were to act as his personal secretary and bookkeeper. During a period of approximately a year and one-half beginning in December of 1965, plaintiff's secretary purloined twenty-nine
checks intended for her employer and forged the necessary endorsements. She cashed some of these checks at the defendant banks while
depositing others to her personal accounts at the same banks. The
entire amount of such deposits was subsequently withdrawn by the
forger prior to discovery of the unauthorized endorsements. All of the
checks were collected from the payor banks.
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant depositary banks
in conversion 70 to recover the amounts of the instruments handled by
them on the forged endorsements. With respect to a majority of these
checks the court held that because of § 3-404 of the UCC, the plaintiff's negligent supervision of his secretary and his books of account
precluded his claim that the endorsements were unauthorized." However, with regard to those instruments where the plaintiff was allowed
to assert the impropriety of the endorsement, the court rejected the

claiming that the forged endorsement is unauthorized. See UCC § 3-404(1) and Comment 4.
T
The California court stated that the plaintiff's suit was one in conversion, implying that the theory of suit was founded in tort law. 507 P.2d at 612. However, the court
in its analysis utilized ratification concepts which were characteristic of only pre-UCC
contract theory of recovery. Id. at 613-14. A plausible explanation for the court's
utilization of ratification where the plaintiff's suit was in conversion lies in the fact
that the "proceeds" language of § 3-419(3) demands reliance on ratification. See text
accompanying note 92 infra.
"There is a great disparity between the treatment given the negligence of the
payee at the trial level and at the supreme court level. The holding of the trial court
is discussed at great length in the intermediate appellate court decision (103 Cal. Rptr.
610) which was vacated by the supreme court.
There were essentially four groups of checks stolen by the payee's employee: (1)
fourteen rent checks payable to payee as representative for a real property investment
group of which he was a member; (2) six checks for interest payments on an account
which the payee maintained in his capacity as receiver for the Orange County Superior
Court; (3) eight checks payable to an elderly female client whose financial affairs were
managed by the plaintiff; and (4) a single check payable to plaintiff for legal services.
The plaintiff's employee purloined the checks in the following manner: Group 1 checks
(from December 1965 until June 1966 took the monthly rent checks and cashed them
at defendant Union Bank; from July 1966 to January 1967 took the next seven rent
checks and deposited them to an account at defendant Crocker Bank); Group 2 checks
(cashed three at Union Bank in October and December of 1965 and April of 1966;
thereafter, cashed or deposited three at Crocker); Group 3 checks (from October 1966
to June 1967 the eight checks were deposited at Crocker); and Group 4 check (cashed
at Union in February 1967).
The superior court and the intermediate appellate court held that the negligence
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availability of any defense under § 3-419(3) since the defendant was
held to have retained the proceeds of the checks in its hands. 2
The Cooper court proceeded through three stages of analysis in
order to hold the depositary bank liable under the language of § 3419(3). First, through application of the pre-UCC doctrine of ratification7:3 the court established that the proceeds of the checks in question
had been received by the depositary bank. 4 However, in order to
meet the precise requirement of the subsection, the court had to find
that these same proceeds were still in the hands of the bank at the
time the owner filed his suit in conversion. To do so, the court entered
upon its second stage of analysis. Relying on both pre-UCC judicial
doctrine 75 and the UCC itself,76 the court held that upon receipt of the
check proceeds the bank became the debtor of the true owner. As a
debtor, the bank was entitled to mingle the check proceeds with its
own. 77 Therefore, it became necessary for the court to find a way for
the plaintiff to identify his proceeds among those of the bank in
of the plaintiff would bar recovery only on the Group 1 checks deposited after April 1,
1966. See 103 Cal. Rptr. at 614-16. On the other hand, without explanation the supreme court held that negligence was a bar to plaintiff's action on all the checks dealt
with after April 1, 1966. See 507 P.2d at 618, 622. This is a totally unjustified disparity.
The supreme court either interpreted the trial court's finding of negligence improperly
or engaged in its own fact-finding mission. Either action is inexcusable.
72507 P.2d at 615-16. Because the trial court had found that the defendant had
acted in good faith and with reasonable care, the only way by which the California
court could hold the depositary bank liable under § 3-419(3) was to show that the
check proceeds were still in its hands.
73
See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the ratification
doctrine.
11507 P.2d at 614.
75
Under the NIL theory of recovery for money had and received, if the payee
ratified the bank's collection of the proceeds, the bank became liable to the payee as
a debtor. See notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this preUCC theory of recovery.
76
Relying on UCC § 4-213(3) and the comments thereunder, the Cooper court held
that the UCC supported the bank's status as a debtor upon final settlement. 507 P.2d
at 615. Specifically, because § 4-213(3) made a collecting bank accountable to its
customer for "the amount of the item" rather than for its proceeds, a conclusion that
the UCC anticipated the continuation of a bank's pre-UCC liability as a debtor to the
true owner of a check seemed justified. The Official Comment to § 4-213 only served
to lend further weight to the court's conclusion: "When this credit given by it [the
bank] so becomes final, in the usual case its agency status terminates and it becomes
a debtor to its customer for the amount of the item." UCC § 4-213, Comment 9
(emphasis added).
"See 507 P.2d at 614 n.8, citing A. ScoTr, TRusTS § 534, at 3712-18 (3d ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as Scorr, in order to establish that the bank, as a debtor, was
entitled to use the proceeds as its own. This is the regular custom of banks and indeed
it would seem that a bank could hardly function in any other way.
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general. The court met this challenge and essentially concluded its
analysis through the imposition of a constructive trust,78 an equitable
doctrine which in a banking context allows a true owner of a check
to trace his proceeds though commingled with those of his debtor,
provided that debtor has sufficient funds to meet the claim." Since
in Cooper the funds of the bank exceeded the amount of the true
owner's claim, the court held that the plaintiff could trace the proceeds into the hands of the bank and thus avoid the § 3-419(3) defense."'
Through the first two stages of its analysis the Cooper decision
seems to be founded on sound legal principles. Ratification was an
established pre-UCC theory of recovery for a true owner against a
depositary bank, and nothing in § 3-419(3) implies that its rationale
has been rejected.' The California court's description of the payeedepositary bank relationship as that type of relationship which exists
between a creditor and his debtor is also a sound legal position under
the UCC.82 It is only at the third and final stage of its analysis-the
imposition of the constructive trust-that serious possibilities of impropriety appear.
In utilizing a.constructive trust to allow the plaintiff to trace
proceeds into the hands of the bank, the court specifically relied on
the tracing rights which a proper claimant may exercise against an
insolvent bank in order to .rise above the bank's general creditors.
Such reliance seems to have been misplaced, since the bank was not
insolvent and none of the grounds upon which a court generally depends for its equitable powers to protect a particular creditor was
present.' It would have been more proper for the Cooper court to
1'507 P. 2d at 615.

"Scorr § 540.
11507 P.2d at 615-16. The court attempted to reinforce its conclusion that the
defendant did not part with the proceeds of the check by looking to an additional
aspect of Article 3. From the distinctive use of the term "proceeds" in § 3-419(3), as

opposed to the term "for value" which establishes holder in due course status for a
bank under UCC § 3-302, the court reasoned that § 3-419(3) was not meant to protect
the depositary bank merely because it may have given value to the forger. 507 P.2d at

616. This argument is not persuasive in a conversion context. Holder in due course language, even by analogy, would seem wholly inapplicable where forged endorsements
are involved since the party taking from the forger cannot become a "holder." See UCC
§§ 1-201(20), 3-201, 3-404.
"Subsection 3-419(3) states that the depositary bank shall not be liable to a true
owner "in conversion or otherwise." Clearly, that language recognizes the distinct
theories of suit which existed before the UCC and anticipates their continued viability
under the UCC, subject, of course, to the § 3-419(3) defense.

"Note 76 supra.
"Generally, a constructive trust will be imposed to protect a particular creditor
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draw its discussion of tracing rights from the equitable doctrines
related to the conversion of personal property. 4
An innocent converter who transforms a true owner's property
85
into a new "product" acquires legal title to the property. Coextensive with this legal title, however, is an equitable duty to convey
the new "product" to the true owner,85 who enforces his equitable
rights against the innocent converter through the imposition of an
equitable lien."' If the converter mingles the new "product," which
often is in the form of cash proceeds, with his own funds, the equitable lien afforts the owner the right to trace his cash "product" within
those funds.88 Recovery is allowed provided the converter's funds are
equal to or in excess of the amount of the owner's claim. 9 The Cooper
court's discussion of tracing rights thus seems accurate, but only in
light of the equitable lien theory of relief.
Despite the propriety of tracing under equitable lien theory when
conversion occurs, an inherent inconsistency appears in the Cooper
court's analysis. This inconsistency derives from the doctrine of ratification which, as the court properly recognized, was so vital to the
plaintiff's recovery from the bank under § 3-419(3). Ratification provided the means to establish that the proceeds of the check were
received by the depositary bank. Yet, it also simultaneously transformed the wrongful collection of the check into a proper act. When
the Cooper court imposed the trust, it apparently overlooked this
important effect of ratification. Because the payee ratified the exchange of the check for its proceeds, he should no longer have been
entitled to claim that the bank converted the check. Absent converonly when an improper act of the debtor, such as fraud, induces the extension of credit
and other creditors are likely to benefit as a result of that wrongful act. See Scorr §§
528, 529.
"The tracing principles that are applicable to the conversion of personal property
are identical to those discussed by the court. Compare Scorr §§ 508.1, 515 with § 540.
However, when a converter does not act wilfully, a court can only properly invoke an
equitable lien for the true owner. Id. § 509. The difference between the equitable lien
and the constructive trust discussed by the court is simply that the latter forces the
wrongdoer to account for all profits derived by the wrongful act. Id. § 462. The former
is only enforced to the extent of the value of the owner's property that was lost. Id. §
463.
'G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 476 (2d ed. 1965).
"Id. See also ScoTr § 507.
"Scorr § 509. See note 84 supra for discussion of the equitable lien.
mScorr § 515.
"Id.
"The Cooper court recognized this effect of ratification: "This ratification transmutes the remittance of funds by the payor bank into an authorized act for which it
may debit its customer's account." 507 P.2d at 614.
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sion by the bank, the true owner should not have been able to invoke
the equitable power of the court and should have been relegated to
the legal remedies of a creditor against his debtor. Those legal remedies have never included a right on the part of the creditor to trace
his proceeds as was allowed by the Cooper court."
As long as ratification is an essential part of a true owner's theory
of recovery, it would seem that tracing principles would not be applicable. Under pre-UCC judicial doctrine ratification was not necessary
to the genuine payee's suit in tort for conversion.92 Therefore, the
question must be raised as to the propriety of equitable relief as
granted in Cooper in the absence of ratification. The answer lies quite
simply in the fact that the language of § 3-419(3) demands an examination into the location of proceeds. Under the statute a depositary
bank can only be liable to the extent of any proceeds in its hands.
Since ratification is the only apparent method by which to establish
the receipt of proceeds by the depositary bank when a conversion has
occurred, the wording of § 3-419(3) mandates its use. Thus, the
wholesale necessity of ratification theory would seem to preclude the
application of equitable tracing principles as attempted by the California court.
What the Cooper decision emphatically illustrates is the total
absence in Article 3 or elsewhere in the UCC of an accurate definition
of the meaning of the § 3-419(3) phrase "proceeds remaining in [its]
hands. ' ' 3 The non-existence of such a definition provided the court
with the opportunity to utilize a totally unexpected sort of legal analysis in order to satisfy the requirement of the subsection and to hold
the bank liable. To the extent that it would serve to clarify the meaning of § 3-419(3), a statutory definition would be helpful. However,
in the absence of such a definition there would appear to be a logical
source from which to derive an accurate understanding of the phrase:
the pre-UCC rule of decisions which § 3-419(3) is stated to have
adopted.94
91f the exchange of the check for proceeds is ratified and therefore not wrongful,
no equitable duty to convey those proceeds arises. A bank is entitled to use the proceeds as its own since it is the debtor of the true owner and commits no wrong by doing
so. ScoTr § 525. The bank's obligation to account to the true owner for the amount of
the proceeds is an dbligation as a debtor and provides no basis for the imposition of a
constructive trust or equitable lien. Id. at § 534.
"See text accompanying note 36 supra.
rThe only definition in the UCC is located at § 9-306(1): "'Proceeds' includes
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." In the context of determining the meaning of the § 3-419(3) defense,
a definition designed for application to security interests is not very helpful.
"Official Comment 5 to UCC § 3-419(3) states in pertinent part:
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Gruntal v.National Surety Co.,95 is characteristic of the pre-UCC
broker liability cases upon which § 3-419(3) is claimed to be based.
Although the basic justification for the exceptional defense allowed
the broker derived from the bearer nature of the bonds that were sold,
the New York court additionally stated that the defense should apply
only when the broker had paid the purchase money over to his principal." The basic thrust of the decision was that a broker who in good
faith sold bearer bonds should not sustain a financial loss if the bonds
are discovered to be stolen. 7 It seems logical that the drafters of § 3419(3) intended to protect the depositary bank as against a true
owner in the same manner when they limited the bank's liability to
the amount of "proceeds remaining in [its] hands."
Why the drafters chose to utilize the word "proceeds" to convey
this protection to depositary banks poses an additional question. As
discussed previously, pre-UCC depositary bank liability to a true
owner was determined without regard to the location of proceeds.
Many of the courts applying the NIL98 stated this rule of liability in
a manner which incorporated the concept of "proceeds," holding that
"it [was] no defense to [the depositary] bank that it [had] fully
paid over and accounted for the proceeds of [the] check . . . to the
forger. . .. "I' It would seem proper to assume that the drafters of §
3-419(3) had this substantial body of pre-UCC law in mind when they
chose to utilize identical language in the subsection. Therefore, the
drafters' use of the term proceeds seems merely to have been responsive to the terminology incorporated in this body of law that preceded
§ 3-419(3).
Subsection 3 is intended to adopt the rule of decisions which has held
that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank, who deals
with a negotiable instrument for his principal in good faith is not
liable to the true owner for conversion of the instrument or otherwise,
except that he may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the
instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands.
"$254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682, 246 N.Y.S. Appdx. 468 (1930). Gruntal is cited in
the Official Comment to § 8-318 as the basis for the good faith defense provided the
broker who sells investment securities on behalf of his principal. It is generally considered a leading case illustrating the justification for the exceptional pre-UCC treatment
afforded the seller of bearer bonds. See 2 N.Y. LAW REvISION COMMISSION STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1081-82 (1955).
"173 N.E. at 684.
"1Id.
"See cases at note 53 supra.
"Mackey-Woodard, Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 197 Kan. 536, 419 P.2d 847, 854
(1966) (emphasis added). The full passage of this quotation can be found at note 45
supra.
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In light of the improper invocation of constructive trust doctrine
by the California court and the presence of what would appear to be
a logical source from which the court could have ascertained the
meaning of the "proceeds" language utilized in § 3-419(3), Cooper v.
Union Bank, just as the Ervin decision, should not seriously affect the
future status of § 3-419(3). Both decisions involve strained statutory
analysis. The courts imaginatively, although inappropriately,
adopted constructions of § 3-419(3) which in effect maintained the
pre-UCC status quo for depositary bank liability in conversion to a
true owner. In light of the seemingly obvious intent of § 3-419(3) to
protect depositary banks and thereby substantially disrupt the status
quo, the question must be raised as to why the two state courts in
question chose to construe the statute as they did. In both decisions
an appealing justification has been offered-to avoid circuity of action and promote justice. 0
Traditionally, as alternatives to his rights against the depositary
bank, a true owner of a forged instrument has had the right to recover
in conversion against the drawee bank' or on the underlying contractual obligation against the drawer of the check.' The UCC has maintained these two rights of action for the genuine payee.0 3 Additionally, the UCC has adopted the pre-UCC policy which ultimately
placed the loss for a forged endorement on the party to whom the
forger transferred the check.0 4 Thus, despite § 3-419(3), in most cases
the depositary bank will bear the loss incurred by the typical inability
to recover from the forger himself. Because of this loss allocation
under the UCC and the usual geographic proximity of the depositary
bank to the true owner, there are appealing reasons for disregarding
the defense provided by § 3-419(3). These policy considerations were
well recognized prior to the UCC105 and do tend to raise substantial
questions about the propriety of the § 3-419(3) defense.
Yet it is not clear that there are no valid reasons for requiring the
true payee to pursue the more traditional route of suit against the
drawer or the drawee bank. One possible detrimental result of a direct
' See Ervin, 3 UCC REP. SERV. at 318-19, and Cooper, 507 P.2d at 617.
'01
See cases at note 8 supra.
'02 d.
The true owner's right of action against the drawer is preserved by the fact that
the drawer's underlying obligation to pay is not discharged when the check is paid over
a forged encorsement. See UCC §§ 3-603, 3-802. The payee's rights against the drawee
bank are preserved at § 3-419(1)(c) and (2).
'The loss on a forged endorsement is transferred back to the party who took from
the forger via the transfer warranties of § 3-417 and § 4-207 of the UCC.
See, e.g., National Union Bank v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 449, 129 A. 688,
690 (1925).
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suit by a payee against a depositary bank is that in allocating the loss
from the forged endorsement it potentially allows for the circumvention of a possibly negligent act by a drawer." 6 When a payee institutes
a direct suit against a depositary bank, thus by-passing the drawer,
it may be indicative of an attempt on the part of the payee to get his
money without placing the loss on the party with whom he has done
business, a course of action which could have jeopardized future business dealings with the negligent drawer. There is no method readily
apparent under the UCC whereby the depositary bank could then
force this loss onto the drawer,' 7 where it would lie were the payee
forced to utilize the traditional means of suit." 8 It is an established
policy of the UCC that a depositary bank should bear the loss incident to the collection of a check over a forged endorsement only when
both the payee and the drawer are free from any negligence that may
have caused the unauthorized signature.' Section 3-419(3), by forc"'A drawer who substantially contributes to the creation of an unauthorized endorsement is precluded from compelling the drawee bank to reinstate his account.
UCC § 3-406. The most common form of drawer's negligence is a mismailing of an order
instrument to a party with the same name as the payee. Id. § 3-406, Comment 7. Where
a check has been mismailed the payee may have the rights necessary to sue in conversion against the depositary bank. See, e.g., Allen v. Mendelsohn, 207 Ala. 527, 93 So.
416 (1922); Hoffman v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 Ill. App. 290, 20 N.E.2d 121 (1939); Crisp
v. State Bank, 32 N.D. 263, 155 N.W. 78 (1915). Cases also have denied the rights,
stating that without delivery the payee gets no title to the instrument. Jones v. Bank
of America, 49 Cal. App.2d 115, 121 P.2d 94 (1942); People ex rel. Nelson v. Kaspar
American State Bank, 364 Ill. 121, 4 N.E.2d 14 (1936).
'"Article 3 of the UCC contains no specific provisions which would allow the
depositary bank to force its loss onto the negligent drawer. The absence of such a
provision seems to deny to the bank the ability to use the "vouching-in" procedure of
§ 3-803. However, in a situation where the negligence of the drawer has caused the
forgery, it would seem reasonable to grant the directly-sued depositary bank the same
defense against the payee which the drawee bank could have asserted against the
drawer, on the theory that the loss ultimately should be imposed upon the person
whose negligence caused the forgery. Compare the practice of courts in direct suits by
a drawer at note 109 infra. A liberal construction of rules of impleader could allow the
depositary bank to bring the drawer into any direct suit by the payee. Additionally,
making the drawer a party would solve the evidentiary problem caused by the fact that
the negligence of the drawer may be exclusively within the personal knowledge of the
drawer and the payee.
"'See note 106 supra.
'"'Under the UCC a payee whose negligence has caused the unauthorized signature
is precluded from recovery against any bank by virtue of § 3-404(1). See note 69 supra.
If a payee settles with a negligent drawer, the drawer cannot get his account reinstated
at his own bank. See note 106 supra. Where the negligent drawer is allowed a direct
suit against a depositary bank, the bank is afforded the same defenses against the
drawer which the drawee bank could have asserted against him. See International
Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Prudential Ins.
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ing a payee to seek recovery from the drawer or the drawee bank,
seems to ensure that result."'
The possible misallocation of loss which can exist if the payee is
allowed his direct suit against the depositary bank merely serves to
illustrate the risks involved when a court decides to disregard a statute in order to enforce a policy of judicial economy and fairness. The
ultimate results reached in Ervin or Cooper may have been just in
light of the particular facts presented in each case.'' Yet a court,
which sets out in a case of first impression to consider a new statutory
provision, has a duty to pay proper deference to the legislative function. By disregarding the meaning of a statutory provision, which
seemingly becomes obvious when examined against the background
of the judicial doctrines which preceded it, a court disregards that
duty.
What the future holds for the protection offered depositary banks
under § 3-419(3) will eventually be determined by the precedential
value afforded the Ervin and Cooper decisions. Certainly the courts
cannot be blamed for their apparent frustration with the manner in
which the drafter chose to alter a substantial body of pre-UCC judicial doctrine. The Official Comment to § 3-419(3) is wholly inadequate in that it fails to offer a satisfactory justification for the change.
However, if courts in the future examine the pre-UCC judicial decisions on the liability of agents and depositary banks, the language of
§ 3-419(3) will assume a clarity which cannot be misconstrued; i.e.,
that the depositary bank is to be protected from liability under § 3419(3) just as the seller of bearer bonds was protected under the NIL.
Admittedly, this interpretation of the § 3-419(3) defense raises serious questions of public policy and justice. In light of these serious
problems, both Ervin and Cooper are appealing. Yet the seeming
Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis., 1970); Allied Concord
Financial Corp. v. Bank of America, 257 Cal. App.2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Atlas Supply Co., 211 Ga. App. 1, 172 S.E.2d 632
(1970). Contra, Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345
Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
"'Were the courts in Cooper and Ervin able to develop a basis upon which the
depositary bank could force the loss onto the negligent drawer, the policy arguments
underlying their rejection of the § 3-419(3) defense would have increased merit. See
note 107 supra for some plausible suggestions. Certainly, the desire to avoid circuity
of action has been instrumental in the increased judicial recognition of the drawer's
direct suit against the depositary bank when the drawer has settled with the payee on
the underlying obligation. In doing so, however, the courts have been careful to provide
the depositary banks with any defenses the drawee bank may have asserted against
the drawer. See cases at note 109 supra.
"'Absent negligence on the part of the drawer, the direct suit by the payee seems
to be both efficient and fair.

